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Abstract 
The thesis studied the visualization of safety indicators in oil and gas installations. Safety 
indicators measure the changes in the level of safety, and visualization communicates risk to 
safety management and specialists. Both aspects are important in the oil and gas industry 
where safety is a big part of daily operations because of the major hazards that is associated 
with the production of oil and gas. 
The first part explored which traits are important for safety indicators and (risk) visualization 
respectively.  This was based on a literature review on the two topics to gather critical points 
of the current knowledge including substantial findings as well as theoretical and 
methodological contributions. The findings were then organized into a spreadsheet where it 
was easy to see what requirements were recurrent and popular, and from this a set of 
requirements of visualizing safety indicators was then established. This selection of seven 
requirements was based on the goal that the requirements could apply to both indicators 
and the visualization, and the relevance of them. 
The Integrated Operations Maintenance and Modification Planner (IO-MAP) was to be the 
case for this thesis in order to apply the set of requirements on a test. IO-MAP is a software 
tool that is developed to support the planning of maintenance and modification activities on 
offshore installations to help decision-makers gain a better overview which leads to 
enhanced safety. 
Results from IO-MAP’s review of the requirements suggest: 
• Include a total risk picture to visualize the sum of risks connected to the planned 
tasks per day 
• Adding more types of work that requires work permit (e.g. isolation of safety system, 
pressure testing, and work with dangerous and radioactive substances) 
• Implementing more information about the tasks to get the full picture of the tasks 
and how they are done in practice 
It was found that not all requirements were suited to test the safety-related information 
from IO-MAP. This could be due to the fact that not all information from IO-MAP could be 
directly transferred as visualizing safety indicators rather than being explicitly an indicator or 
a visualization technique.  
  
  
 
 
Sammendrag 
Denne masteroppgaven studerte visualiseringen av sikkerhetsindikatorer for olje- og 
gassinstallasjoner. Sikkerhetsindikatorer måler endringer av nivået i forhold sikkerhet, og 
visualisering formidler risiko to sikkerhetsledelse og andre spesialister. Begge aspekter er 
viktig i olje- og gassbransjen hvor sikkerhet er en stor del av daglige operasjoner på grunnlag 
av de store farene som knyttet til produksjonen av olje og gass. 
Den første delen undersøkte hvilke egenskaper som er viktige for henholdsvis 
sikkerhetsindikatorer og (risiko)visualisering. Dette var basert på et litteratursøk på de to 
emnene for å samle kritiske punkter fra dagens kunnskap inkludert betydelige funn så vel 
som teoretiske og metodiske bidrag. Funnene ble organisert i et regneark hvor det var 
påfallende å se hvilke egenskaper som var gjennomgående og populære. Fra dette ble et 
sett med krav til visualisering av sikkerhetsindikatorer etablert. Valget av de kravene som var 
i settet var basert på målet om at de kunne anvendes på både indikatorer og visualisering 
samt relevansen av dem. 
Integrated Operations Maintenance and Modification Planner (IO-MAP) er et software-
verktøy som skulle gjennomgå kravene nevnt ovenfor. IO-MAP ble utviklet for å støtte 
planlegging av vedlikehold og modifikasjonsarbeid på offshore installasjoner for å hjelpe 
beslutningstakere få bedre oversikt under planlegging for å bedre sikkerheten.  
Resultatene fra IO-MAPs gjennomgang av krav foreslår: 
• Inkluder et samlet risikobilde for å visualisere summen av risiko koblet til 
arbeidsoppgaver per dag 
• Legge til flere typer arbeid som krever arbeidstillatelse (f.eks. isolering av 
sikkerhetssystem, trykktesting og arbeid med farlige og radioaktive stoffer) 
• Implementer ytterligere informasjon om arbeidsoppgavene for å få samlet bilde av 
arbeidsoppgavene og hvordan de blir gjort i praksis 
Det viser seg at ikke alle kravene egnet seg til å teste den sikkerhetsmessige informasjonen 
fra IO-MAP. Dette kan skyldes at ikke all informasjon kunne tilskrives som visualisering av 
sikkerhetsindikatorer, men at den kunne være enten en indikator eller en 
visualiseringsteknikk. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
Background 
There are many potential sources of harm to the health and safety of the workers on 
offshore installations and marine environment. The threat of typical industrial dangers 
combined with the hazards of oil and gas extraction can lead to threats to the structural 
integrity of the installation, explosions and fire, blowouts, dangers associated with drilling 
operations and injuries to personnel. A tragic example is the Macondo accident, where a 
blowout killed 11 workers on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, ignited a huge fireball that 
caused the rig to sink and leaving the well spewing crude oil which had a huge negative 
impact on the environment. 
Previous to the accident Deepwater Horizon was issued pollution citations 18 times between 
2000 and 2010, and had investigated 16 fires and other incidents. This was however not 
considered unusual in the Mexico gulf, but the oil rig had other serious incidents as well. It 
began to sink in 2008 after a section of pipe was accidentally removed from the platform’s 
ballast system and 77 people were evacuated. In March 2010, the rig experienced a series of 
problems which lasted up until the disaster (DHSG, 2011). These problems should have 
indicated that the drilling rig was ready for some maintenance and modifications, but was 
instead driven with pressure of time and money, and thus compromising safety. 
In addition to pressure of time and balancing between risk and safety, the future of the oil 
and gas industry holds many challenges such as less accessible oil discoveries, other energy 
sources may emerge, the global economic turndown and more complex operational 
challenges. 
This, in turn, challenges the safety and the safety-management within oil and gas-production 
to think in new ways by utilizing new technologies and work forms and processes. IO 
(Integrated Operations) is such a concept. It refers to new work processes and ways of 
performing oil and gas exploration and production through new information and 
communication technology. 
This thesis will explore which traits are important for respectively safety indicators and (risk) 
visualization. Safety indicators because it measures the changes in the level of safety, and risk 
visualization as it communicates risk to safety management and specialists. Both aspects are 
important in the oil and gas industry where safety is a big part of daily operations because of 
the major hazards that is associated with the production of oil and gas. 
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There are numerous types of indicators in the literature. In general, indicators are often used 
to measure the current state of a system or a process, or its future development. They often 
use data from models as a foundation where the right kind of information, effectively 
monitored and which inform decision making, will make a significant contribution to 
reducing the risks of accidents. Safety indicators differs in that they give a measure of safety 
performance, and as a result can identify what actions are (or going to be) successful in 
improving safety.  
Risk visualization can help decision-makers and their support, but also others using it 
interpret information to provide the best solutions for minimizing risk e.g. when planning 
operations. As with indicators, extracting the right information can support the right 
decisions and actions.  
While safety indicators have been in the industry for some time, risk visualization is not that 
wide-spread, but both are under constant development and are highly relevant in regards to 
safety. This is associated to the rapid development of information and communications 
technology. 
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Objective 
The aim of this thesis is to make suggestions for further developments of IO-MAP and to 
develop a set of criteria for visualizing safety indicators. 
The main contents of this thesis are to: 
• Do a literature review of requirements to safety indicators 
• Do a literature review of requirements for risk visualization 
• Establish a set of requirements for visualizing safety indicators 
• Extract the safety related information from IO-MAP 
• Apply the requirements on the information from IO-MAP 
• Make suggestions for improving IO-MAP 
 
Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 describes the methodology used in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 gives the theoretical background with descriptions of safety indicators and risk 
visualization and a literature review of these two topics. A set of requirements are then 
extracted from both topics.  
Chapter 4 examines the safety-related information from IO-MAP which is the case for this 
thesis. 
Chapter 5 puts the safety-related information from IO-MAP through the requirements from 
the literature review. 
Chapter 6 includes a discussion about the chapter 3 through 5 and summarizes the main 
findings. 
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List of notions 
This part will explain key terms used throughout the thesis. 
Requirements - a singular documented physical and functional need that a particular 
product or process must be able to perform. In classical engineering approach, sets of 
requirements are used as inputs in the design stages of product development, and an 
important input into the verification process. 
Indicators - can be defined as something that helps us to understand where we are, where 
we are going and how far we are from the goal. Within engineering it can be an instrument 
that displays certain operating conditions in a machine, such as a gauge showing 
temperature, speed, pressure, etc.  
Safety indicators – it is an extension of indicators by measuring the changes in the level of 
safety (related to major accident prevention, preparedness and response) as a result of 
actions taken. It can be related to defense lines such as physical barriers and safety 
functions. 
Risk indicators – also an extension of indicators by measuring changes in the risk level on an 
installation by utilizing risk models and cover the most important risk factors with respect to 
major accidents having consequences for personnel onboard the installations. 
Visualization - any technique for creating images, diagrams, or animations to communicate a 
message. Visualization through visual imagery has been an effective way to communicate 
both abstract and concrete ideas for millennia. 
Risk visualization – it is the systematic effort of using (interactive) images to augment the 
quality of risk communication along the entire risk management cycle. This is done by 
utilizing graphic representations such as maps, charts, diagrams and visual metaphors. 
IO-MAP (Integrated Operations Maintenance and Modification Planner) - a software tool 
that is developed to support the planning of maintenance and modification activities on 
offshore installations within the operational concept Integrated Operations (IO). 
IO (Integrated Operations) - refers to new work processes and ways of performing oil and 
gas exploration and production, which has been facilitated by new information and 
communication technology between offshore platforms and land-based offices. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Methodology 
The progress of this thesis was set in 5 phases. In order to test the quality and apply the 
safety-related information from IO-MAP on requirements, those requirements needed to be 
based on criteria from the current literature. All the safety-related information from IO-MAP 
were then extracted based on reports I received from Sizarta Sarshar, which has been 
involved in the IO-MAP process, and also based on the day I got to try it out in IFE, Halden. 
This information went through a checklist containing the requirements found, where a 
quantitative score and a comment were provided to each indicator and visualization 
technique. 
Figure 1 The research process of this thesis  
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Phase 1 - Perform a literature review of requirements to safety (performance) 
indicators and risk visualization 
A literature review of the requirements to safety performance indicators and risk 
visualization were to be the foundation of the thesis. This is to gather critical points of the 
current knowledge including substantial findings as well as theoretical and methodological 
contributions to the topic. The literature on safety performance indicators is rich and 
plentiful. Online searches of the topic led to many results, which meant I had to filter out a 
lot of literature, though the requirements were surprisingly similar. Literature on risk 
visualization is a lot less extensive, but it proved to be relevant in establishing criteria. 
 
Phase 2 - Choosing the requirements from the literature 
After gathering findings from the literature, it was organized into a spreadsheet where it was 
easy to see what requirements were recurrent and popular. Decisions then had to be made 
on which requirements to use. These decisions were based on the goal that the 
requirements could apply to both indicators and the visualization, and the relevance of 
them. The list was set to six final requirements to keep it concise. 
 
Phase 3 - Find safety-related information from IO-MAP 
Based on a usability study paper from the first version, a presentation of the second version 
of IO-MAP and testing the software tool first hand was sufficient to extract enough safety-
related information to test them. The IO-MAP project is currently at ease and my impression 
is that it is not clear at the moment what the future of the project holds. 
It would have been desirable to have more information about the project which is limited to 
the reports available and a day of trying it first-hand. If I had been present in every step of 
the IO-MAP project, I would have had more knowledge about the rationale of choosing 
every indicator and visualization technique, although I would then be a bit biased to them 
and also would have not been able to get my “own” first impression. 
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Phase 4 - Run the information from the case through the requirements 
This phase consisted of running the information from IO-MAP through the requirements in 
order to break down the information and analyze its quality. 
A quantitative scale with five levels was given to each “indicator” to demonstrate the level of 
operability/usability. The scale is a five-point scale with ranges: very inadequate – 
inadequate – adequate – good – very good. 
 
Phase 5 - Recommendations for improving IO-MAP and comments to the set of 
requirements 
The final phase consisted of gathering the analysis of the “indicators” that could be 
improved and the reasoning behind it to give suggestions for improving IO-MAP. A 
discussion about the literature review, comments to the set of requirements and the safety-
related information in IO-MAP together with the process of running that information 
through the set of requirements is included in the last chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Theoretical background 
 
 
This chapter sums up the theories and concepts that are relevant for this thesis. It will 
explain the basics of safety indicators and risk visualization, and present the state of the art 
as it is in the literature. To know the state of the art, and knowing what requirements the 
literature possess about safety indicators and risk visualization is important as several 
elements from IO-MAP will be run through those requirements. 
 
What is an indicator 
Indicators are used in many parts of the professional life, such as business, science and 
engineering. This means that indicators are used in many different ways, but in relation to 
safety science it can generally be a measure or pointer that monitors safety related 
processes. 
Indicators are based on information from underlying data and models. It is important to 
choose the right type of information to represent the indicator, as lacking information would 
at best give partial indications of safety. The wrong information would lead the users of the 
indicators astray. The right type of information for indicators leads to early warnings or safer 
decisions, which leads to more confidence when further decisions are to be made. Indicators 
can also play an important motivational role, especially at the higher management levels, 
with making safety visible in a summary way and making it suitable for communication and 
comparison. 
Two basic indicator versions are risk indicators and safety (performance) indicators. While 
risk indicators are developed from a risk based approach, utilizing a risk model and mainly 
quantitative, the safety indicator may be developed from a variety of methods, such as the 
safety performance method, the incident based method and the resilience based method.  
Indicators can be defined by Øien (2001) as "a measurable or operational variable that can 
be used to describe the condition of a broader phenomenon or aspect of reality", and OECD 
(2008) defines safety performance indicators as “observable measures that provide insights 
into a concept – safety – that is difficult to measure directly.”  
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These two definitions are somewhat similar, meaning there is slight differences between 
indicator and safety performance indicator as terms, but they still possess much of the same 
qualities. There exist several other variations of indicators as well such as process safety- and 
personnel safety indicators, leading and lagging indicators, feedback, monitor and drive 
indicators etc. 
In short, risk indicators measures changes in the risk level on an installation during normal 
operation in the time periods between updating the QRAs, thus obtaining an “indication” of 
the risk status on a regular basis. The risk indicators are developed from a risk based 
approach and cover the most important risk factors with respect to major accidents having 
consequences for personnel onboard the installations (Øien & Sklet, 2001). 
This thesis will be concentrated around safety (performance) indicators which can be 
considered to be “a means for measuring the changes in the level of safety (related to major 
accident prevention, preparedness and response), as a result of actions taken” (OECD, 2003). 
Holmberg et.al. (1994) defines safety indicator as an observable characteristic that 
presumably holds a positive correlation with safety, and has been selected, among other 
means, for the purpose of supervision of safety. The safety indicator can be related to 
defense lines according to defense-in-depth such as physical barriers and safety functions. 
(Defense-in-depth means in this case to minimize the system's vulnerability to human and 
technical errors by providing independent and diverse layers of protection.) 
I recommend the definition by Holmberg et.al as it gives an extensive coverage of what a 
safety indicator is. This definition will be used throughout the thesis.  
Safety indicators can be developed from a safety performance method, incident based 
method or resilience based method. The safety performance method starts from a set of 
influencing factors assumed to be important to safety. The goal of this method is to monitor 
the level of safety in a system, decide where and how to take action, and to motivate those 
in a position of decision making to actually do so. 
The incident based method identifies early warning indicators by studying incidents or 
accidents. It identifies and sheds light on factors that contributed to one or more 
incidents/accidents. The factors that contributed must have the condition that if it had been 
adequate, then neither the particular incident/accident being analyzed nor similar 
incidents/accidents would have occurred. 
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Resilience based method is a specific approach to manage risk in a proactive manner. It is 
about engineering resilience in organizations and safety management approaches, by 
providing methods, tools and management approaches that help to cope with complexity 
under pressure to achieve success (Hollnagel & Woods, 2006). In order to be resilient, four 
abilities must be basic. These are responding to regular and irregular conditions in an 
effective and flexible manner learn from past events, understand correctly what has 
happened and why, monitor short-term developments and threats; revise risk models and 
anticipate long-term threats and opportunities. 
Using these methods as a foundation together with adequate knowledge will produce 
indicators that will increase the level of safety in any organization. 
 
The importance of indicators 
In order to know where we are heading, we need indications that we are heading in the right 
direction. For practical safety work, this means measuring how well safety is being managed 
by a certain set of indicators. A safety indicator for occupational injuries has traditionally 
been used for many years, and these were the only type of indicators used in the offshore 
petroleum industry for a long time. Then in the late 1990-ties many experts acknowledged 
that additional indicators were needed, especially for aspects relating to major hazards, and 
prevention of such hazards (Vinnem et.al, 2006). 
 
The Norwegian authorities (then the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and now the 
Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA)) defined a project called “the Risk Level Project” in order 
to develop necessary methods for additional indicators. This marked the fundamental need 
for indicators and the continuous development of indicators in the petroleum industry.  
 
Indicators are used everywhere with regards to safety to give pointers as to how good a 
process or an installation is operated safely. Safety management needs tools that gives some 
measurable result which provides an indication of the state that one wants the risk picture 
of.  
 
Indicators may be used in many different ways, and can be used for almost every safety 
aspect. The important aspect is to adapt it so that it gathers every possible risk influencing 
factor (RIF) and does its job of indicating hazards and/or deviations. This is a difficult task as 
the industry is focusing on extending the operational life of installations and systems gets 
more complex with new technology and innovations. It is, however, necessary as safety 
management needs pointers as to if a process or an installation is operated safely. (Dyrseth, 
2013)  
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Requirements to safety indicators 
 
It is not enough to just supply safety indicators to improve safety, or have many indicators 
you got. The sheer quality is also absolutely vital to get the best out of them, and therefore 
we need requirements when developing indicators. Below are some lists of requirements to 
indicators in the literature. 
 
Hale (2009) uses what he calls a standard generic list as requirements for indicators. He 
points out that these criteria should be operationalized based on the purpose of the 
indicator. 
 
• Valid: does it measure what we want to measure? Is correlation enough, or do we 
need the link to be causal? This includes using rates which take account of exposure 
when counting things such as accidents. 
• Reliable: does it give the same measurement when used by different people on the 
same situation, or on different occasions by one person on that same situation? 
• Sensitive: does it respond to changes in what it is measuring with sufficiently large 
changes in the indicator to become statistically significant over a reasonably short 
time? 
• Representative: does the set of KPIs cover all the aspects that are relevant? 
• Openness to bias: can it be manipulated to show better score without changing the 
underlying situation it is supposed to be measuring? 
• Cost-effectiveness: does it cost more to collect the data than would be lost without 
the indicator to assist decisions? 
Hale mentions KPIs which cover many aspects of an organization which defines and measure 
progress towards organizational goals like production and profit. This, in addition to the last 
requirement covering cost-effectiveness, is not included in this thesis' limitations and will not 
be pursued further. 
 
Kjellèn (2000) lists a set of requirements for SHE performance indicators for use in feedback 
control which can be adopted for indicators in general. 
 
• Observable and quantifiable: the first criteria specify that the indicator must be 
possible to observe and measure performance by applying a recognized data-
collection method and scale of measurement. This means that we must be able to tell 
whether the result represents or will represent a deviation from a norm or not. 
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• Valid indicator of the risk of loss: this criteria demands that we measure what we 
intend to measure, i.e. do we get actual indications of proper safety or do we 
measure something that has no effects on safety. 
• Sensitive to change: the indicator must allow for early warning by capturing changes 
in an industrial system that have significant effects on the risk of losses due to 
accidents. 
• Compatible: the indicator must also be able to exist with other safety indicators 
without conflict to prevent the decision-makers receiving contradictory control 
signals. 
• Transparent and easily understood: meaning it is apparent and compatible with the 
users’ theoretical understanding and unconscious mental models. 
• Robust against manipulation: a variation of the validity requirement. Through SHE 
performance monitoring and feedback we want to achieve reductions in the risk of 
accidents. We expect the monitored organization to change its behavior in order to 
achieve improvements. The question is here whether the indicator allows the 
organization to "look good" by, for example, changing reporting behavior, rather than 
making the necessary basic changes that reduce the risk of accidents. 
 
Herrera (2012) uses, amongst other, Kjellèn to build further with criteria for safety indicators. 
Her purpose of the indicators is to support monitoring and more specifically anticipate and 
support actions before something happens, which is close to this thesis’ purpose also.  
 
• Meaningful: indicators are relevant to production and safety, and can be used to 
address what is happening to the system in a specific context. Indicators provide 
information which guides future actions. 
• Sensitive: Indicators provide a clear indication of changes over a reasonable period of 
time. 
• Reliable: Indicators lead to the same interpretations when used by different people 
for the same situation. The interpretations are related to the system and its 
operational context. 
• Measurable: The values of indicators can be rendered in a concise manner, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively. 
• Verifiable: It is possible to confirm the correctness of the value or description of the 
indicators. 
• Inter-subjective: Indicators are understood in the same manner by different people, 
either from same technical community or from society at large. 
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• Operational: The indicators can be used to support concrete actions within the 
operational context. 
• Affordable: The cost of obtaining and using the measures is affordable vis-à-vis the 
benefits. 
 
Haugen et.al (2012) has developed a generic method for identifying major accident risk 
indicators in which they list certain properties that should be considered in the process. 
These properties highlight what they consider to be key criteria. 
 
• Validity: The indicator must be a valid measurement of the factor that it is an 
indicator for. This means that it must be able to reflect changes in the underlying 
phenomenon that is to be measured and that its status co-varies with the status of 
the factor. 
• Measurability: It must be possible to express the status of the indicator in a way that 
can be recorded and compared with previous and future results. Quantifiable 
indicators are preferable, but as a minimum it must be possible to classify the status 
into different categories (e.g. High/Medium/Low, Grade A-F) 
• Comprehensibility: The link between the indicator and the factor must be easy to 
comprehend (intuitive), and the meaning of an indicator must be self-evident in order 
to understand what variables to measure. 
• Reliability: The results from measuring the status of an indicator must be reliable in 
the sense that if a measurement is repeated (at the same time), the same results are 
obtained. Further, measurements must be comparable with previous measurements, 
i.e. the context of measurement must remain stable over time, so that changes in the 
status reflects actual changes in the underlying phenomenon (factor), not changes in 
the measuring process. 
• Useful in the sense that the users have the possibility to influence their status in 
some way. 
• Cost effective so that the effort of gathering data for the indicator not is too excessive 
compared to the benefits gained by using the indicator. This may impact on whether 
an indicator is used or not, but it may also impact on how often an indicator is 
measured. 
 
Haugen et.al (2011) highlights key criteria from e.g. Vinnem (2010) and Øien et.al. (2010): 
• Validity: the indicator must give a valid measurement of the status of a certain risk 
influencing factor 
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• Quantifiable: the indicator should be quantifiable, i.e. possible to measure or at least 
categorize in a consistent manner 
• Regular monitoring: it should be possible to monitor the status of the indicator on a 
regular basis (e.g. monthly), and under comparable conditions with not too extensive 
effort required 
• Sensitivity to change: the indicator should be able to reflect even minor changes in 
the status of the factor 
• The set of indicators should not be too large. 
• The set should be manageable for regular monitoring and follow-up 
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Visualization of information 
 
Visualization is generally any technique used to create and project images, diagrams and 
animations to communicate a message. Given the rapidly growing potential of digital work 
surfaces, visualization will become more and more popular in the industry and safety 
management. 
As with indicators there are different versions of visualization: 
 
Knowledge visualization 
The field of knowledge visualization examines the use of visual representations to improve 
the creation and transfer of knowledge between at least two people. It thus designates all 
graphic means that can be used to construct and convey complex insights. It is the transport 
of facts as well as the transfer of insights, experiences, attitudes, values, expectations, 
perspectives, opinions and predictions, making it possible for someone else to reconstruct 
these insights correctly. 
 
Information visualization 
This form uses the visual representations of abstract data to reinforce human cognition. The 
abstract data include both numerical and non-numerical data, such as text and geographic 
information. It can be defined as “the use of computer-supported, interactive, visual 
representations of abstract data to amplify cognition.” (Card et.al., 1999) 
 
Risk visualization 
The field of risk visualization is quite undeveloped and research is scarce, but we know that it 
is important when it comes to safety in the industry. Risk visualization can make an important 
difference with its numerous cognitive and communicative advantages in comprehending 
and conveying risks through its cognitive and communicative advantages. This is done by 
utilizing graphic representations such as maps, charts, diagrams and visual metaphors. The 
term risk visualization was defined by Eppler & Aeschimann (2008) as the “the systematic 
effort of using (interactive) images to augment the quality of risk communication along the 
entire risk management cycle.” Doing this correctly, i.e. presenting relevant data to the right 
audience and making sure it is not overly complex, can improve the understanding and 
subsequent management of risks in specialist and management teams or stakeholder groups. 
 
The definition of information visualization is similar to that of risk visualization, but the latter 
is more specific as it includes the work of communicating risk, which relates to this thesis and 
will be used throughout this report. 
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Caution when using visualization   
There can be possible pitfalls mentioned by Bresciani & Epler (2008) when safety indicators 
are being visualized. These disadvantages and risks associated with the use of visual 
representations of information can eventually inflict the quality of decision making. Some 
pitfalls are that they may appear more convincing and sound than they really are, misleading 
the perception of reliability of visualization. Another issue can be the (multiple) implicit 
meanings inherent in visualizations leading to ambiguous interpretations. Other drawbacks 
of visualization can be when misleading map types are used or sufficient data is not 
available. 
We can classify visualization disadvantages by their causes or effects. The cause of a 
visualization disadvantage can be the designers intentionally or unintentionally introduce 
mistakes or drawbacks, or the users’ interpretation of visualization.  
This user can exposed to a number of effects e.g. confusion, distraction, misinterpretation, 
limited reflection and delay. These effects can come from factors such as lack of experience, 
time pressure, problems in the users’ personal life or negative stress. 
 
How can indicators back up visualization of safety critical information?  
 
Indicators have information about the state of safety and if deviations are indicated it is the 
intention to visualize, by extracting the right information, and projecting this to the decision-
makers. In a hectic work day we are gathering tons of information with all our senses, so to 
get the critical information to be noticed through visualization we need indicators. 
An example of this is the Aker Kvaerner accident. One of the main causes to the accident in 
Aker Kvaerner, Verdal that took place February 8th, 2012 was caused by interference from 
other operations in the area. In the investigation report it is stated that “due to coherent 
operations on 8 February in the actual area, the crane was not positioned correctly for 
conducting paint inspection on the outside of the jacket.” (Kværner ASA, 2012) An indication 
of where the cranes may not be positioned in the area regarding placement of the crane and 
turning radius, with the help of 3D-mapping, could in this case have given a prohibition to 
start the work until the area was cleared. 
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Requirements to risk visualization 
 
The risk visualization field is currently an emergent, explorative and fragmented domain. The 
field still lacks systematic approaches that try to combine the rich area of visualization 
studies with the needs and requirements of modern risk management. There exists however 
some requirements from the literature related to this. 
Vatn (2012) lists several operators that are applied on a risk picture which is a set of 
undesired events, the causes and factors that may contribute to an undesired event, the 
possible consequences of the event with corresponding influencing factors, and uncertainties 
related to all these issues. 
The operators are: 
• Filtering: with filtering we mean to filter out several aspects of the risk picture. 
Primarily filtering means to focus on only one hazardous event and/or a limited set of 
end consequences, e.g. only number of fatalities. 
• Aggregation: with aggregation we mean the process of summing more than one 
event, more than one cause etc. to give a sum of various events, causes and so on. 
• Merging: with merging we mean the process of grouping several similar outcomes 
into one category representing several outcomes. 
• Zooming: with zooming we mean to view part of the risk picture for a specific location 
(in space and/or time) 
• Hiding/unhiding: with hiding we mean to hide important information when 
presenting the complete risk picture. Typically we hide causes behind the hazardous 
event, factors that influence whether causes could lead to the hazardous event or 
not, and factors that influence the severity of the hazardous event, i.e. the probability 
distribution over the possible end consequences. 
 
Kjellèn (2000) lists some important requirements to a SHE information system to support 
feedback control and diagnosis processes. This can be used for visualization as it is basically 
about spreading information in regards to safety. 
• Distribution and presentation of information 
• Relevance: We are concerned with the decision-makers' experience of the 
benefits of receiving additional information in relation to the perceived "costs" 
(time, attention) in finding the information. To avoid information overload, the 
information that is presented to the decision-maker must be relevant in relation 
to the decision-making context. Relevance is dependent on the types of use of the 
information and the associated needs of data: 
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 In SHE performance monitoring, the user is concerned with information on a 
few so-called key performance indicators. The SHE information system must 
be able to provide information on these indicators. 
 In analysis of accident statistics and risk analysis, the user is concerned with a 
limited set of factual data on each accident and near-accident occurrence of 
interest. As long as the user only applies standard analysis methods, the type 
of data needed is rather limited and can often be determined in advance. 
 When searching for answers to specific questions, the user may need to put a 
whole range of queries to the database, i.e. the "memory" of the SHE 
information system. He/she may also be interested in results of earlier queries 
in order to build experience. Since it is not possible to know all types of 
queries in advance, the relevance will be decided by the coverage of the data. 
 A common use of SHE information systems is in monitoring the status of 
accident counter-measures. In this case, relevant information has to do with 
responsibilities for actions, deadlines and the extent to which they have been 
met or not. The aim is to ensure that the feedback loop has been closed. 
• Comprehensible and easy to survey: to avoid information overload, especially for 
managers at top level must not be overwhelmed by detailed accident data, where 
it is impossible to "see the wood for the trees". 
• Timeliness: is important in order to avoid hazardous deterioration of a system 
resulting from the non-detection of hazardous changes over a long period. In 
safety inspection, the maximum time lag is determined by the inspection 
frequency. This means that the inspection frequency must be higher at 
workplaces that remain unchanged during long periods. 
• Availability of the information when it is needed: Computer support has 
significantly improved the possibilities of accessing experience data for use in 
decisions. We distinguish between periodic reporting, follow-up of actions and 
querying. In the first case, the user must have access to the SHE information 
system at periodic instances in time to get support in generating the necessary 
standard reports. Decision-makers need to access the information system easily at 
any time to get the status of outstanding actions. Users making queries have 
similar needs. When a company buys a new truck for example, the person 
responsible for purchasing may be interested in reviewing earlier truck accidents 
for use as input to specifications. 
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Eppler and Aeschimann’s second step of the risk visualization framework (2008) provides a 
checklist of the key factors to consider or take into account when visualizing risks or risk-
related information. 
When to use (or not to use) visualization in risk management and communication: 
• Don't precipitate the use of risk visualizations. Visualizations reify thoughts or 
opinions, i.e. once something has been represented in an image it is difficult to view 
it in another way. Thus carefully time the use of a graphic risk representation, as 
simple risk conversations can be more flexible than fixing them to an image too 
quickly. 
• Consider the application context and its constraints. It is not always possible to make 
productive use of visualizations in risk management contexts because of lacking time, 
tools or space. Thus, consider the time, resource and know-how constraints in a given 
situation and whether your audience would react positively to visualization or not. 
Visualizations may also detract attention from a presenter in a verbal communication 
setting. In addition, in inter-cultural risk committees the use of visuals may cause 
confusion because of differing expectations and conventions. 
How to use (or not to use) visualization in risk management and communication: 
• Make sure that the risk visualization respects the basic rules of visualization and 
perception. In designing visualizations, you need to respect the basic laws of visual 
perception (i.e. seeing objects in their entirety before perceiving their individual 
parts) and the conventions of graphic design, namely: 
• Items that are bigger should conceptually be more important or significant (as 
they attract more attention). 
• Items that are more centrally placed in a graphic are perceived to be more 
important than those at the periphery of a diagram. 
• Items that are placed close to one another are perceived to be similar or to be 
part of one group. 
• Visualize the same things with the same symbols and colors and different things 
differently. Use a consistent representation style. 
• Don't overload a diagram. Eliminate unnecessary elements whenever possible. 
• Time is usually mapped from left to right. 
• Provide a clear informative title for each diagram or map that indicates the key 
message it contains. 
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• Avoid decorative visualization without added benefit. Check whether your risk 
visualizations add value, e.g. by making a risk easier to understand or assess, by 
communicating risk-related information quicker or by being more memorable than 
text alone. Avoid unessential elements in visualization, such as shading, borders, too 
many colors, animation effects, etc. 
• Think visualizing, not visualization. The power of visualization lies in its potential to 
surface implicit assumptions and capture different perspectives. This is especially true 
if visualization is used interactively by a group of managers and risk analysts. The 
process of creating and modifying a risk visualization is as important (if not more) as 
the final result. 
• Pre-test the risk visualization. Have somebody who was not involved in the creation 
of the visualization give you spontaneous feedback on its comprehensibility. 
 
 
 
 22 
  
 23 
The table of requirements 
The results from the literature review are shown in these tables. Those requirements that are 
recurrent are seen as important and therefore chosen. All the requirements from each piece 
of literature are shown vertically with the summary to the far left. Notice the colors which 
are used for some of the requirements in both tables. They constitute the set of 
requirements which will be used further in the thesis. 
 
Table 1 The different requirements to indicators 
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Table 2 The different requirements to visualization 
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The literature review helped me in understanding what aspects are important with 
visualizing safety indicators. Below is a summary of the literature review from this chapter to 
justify the selection of requirements. 
Requirements for safety indicator 
There are many similarities between the requirements from different sources, which imply 
the importance of these requirements. Validity is a recurring criteria which is important for a 
solid foundation in developing indicators. A valid indicator reassures safety management that 
their decisions based upon these indications are correct. The level of sensitivity in an 
indicator determines how easy it is to detect changes in a system over time, giving better 
leeway in determining whether or not safety is good enough. Reliability is needed to give a 
clear picture of the situation regardless of who the user of the indicator is. The indicator 
needs to be robust against manipulation which will help securing the validity and reliability 
of it. 
Requirements for risk visualization 
Information from the literature shows that visualizing relevant information is a key aspect, 
which is done by filtering out unnecessary information. This reduces cognitive load and 
makes it easier to understand and assess information. Comprehensibility is mentioned by 
Kjellèn and Haugen et.al respectively about visualization and indicators which shows the 
significance of the attribute. It should show changes in the status of the factor in a way that if 
negative effects on safety were to happen, users would be bound to notice it. 
 
 
Table 3 The final set of requirements 
Valid and accurate We measure what we want to measure with a complete and accurate 
visual representation of the data 
Reliable Lead to the same results when used by different people in the same 
situation 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
Should be intuitive, and the context between the factor and the indicator 
must be easy to comprehend 
Efficient and simple 
information 
Avoid decorative visualization to prevent overwhelmingly detailed data 
and reduce cognitive load 
Sensitive to change Able to reflect and visualize changes in the status of the factor 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It should not be possible to override indications of hazardous situations. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Safety-related information in IO-MAP 
 
This chapter will present the safety-related information that IO-MAP possesses. This 
information has been found in “The Integrated Operations Maintenance and Modification 
Planner (IO-MAP) – The first usability evaluation – study and first findings” (2011), 
“Improving Oil & Gas Installation Safety through Visualization of Risk Factors” (2012) and 
testing the software itself. 
The Integrated Operations Maintenance and Modification Planner, IO-Map, is a software tool 
that is developed to support the planning of maintenance and modification activities on 
offshore installations within the operational concept Integrated Operations (IO). The tool is 
designed to serve planners working individually, e.g. discipline specialists, and for planners 
working in a group that makes final decisions. IO-Map aims to visualize risks such as hot 
work, potentially falling objects, workload and weather data to help decision-makers gain a 
better overview when planning which leads to enhanced safety. The tool therefore contains a 
wide set of safety-related information which will be identified in this chapter. IO-MAP is an 
iterative process and not yet fully developed, so information presented here about the 
project is preliminary. 
 
Integrated Operations (IO) 
IO refers to new work processes and ways of performing oil and gas exploration and 
production, which has been facilitated by new information and communication technology, 
e.g. the use of always-on videoconference rooms between offshore platforms and land-
based offices. This has enabled the possibility to move some personnel onshore and use the 
existing human resources more efficiently which saves money, but could in turn affect 
safety. Splitting the team between land and sea demands new work processes, which 
together with ICT, is the two main focus points for IO. Tools like videoconferencing and 3D-
visualization also creates an opportunity for new, more cross-discipline cooperation. One of 
these tools is thus IO-MAP. 
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Figure 1 Screenshot of IO-MAP 
 
Measurements 
Indicators have been defined in this thesis as a "observable characteristic that presumably 
holds a positive correlation with safety, and has been selected, among other means, for the 
purpose of supervision of safety.” IO-MAP possesses several functions that cover this 
definition. 
The work permits status bar contains color indications that classifies if the work has safety 
issues connected to it. These safety issues are: 
 Hot work, class A or B – work with equipment and tools that constitute an effective 
ignition source and which, during normal usage, could ignite an explosive atmosphere 
and/or solid substances or liquids. 
 Entry – work that includes full or partial entering of closed rooms or confined areas 
that do not normally have natural or mechanical ventilation, e.g. tanks, pipes, chain 
wells and exhaust pipes. 
 Work over sea – work that takes place outside of permanent railings. Exceptions are 
work in hydraulic baskets and work on approved scaffolding when an extra safety 
measure (barrier) is used, such as anti-fall securing system, manrider or net. 
 Work on hydrocarbon carrying system – work on pipe systems, tanks and associated 
components that can pose a danger of releasing oil/gas/condensate.  
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Another feature in the status bar is four elements related to communicating risks. These are 
entities which contains information that is attached to the work permit, work order or 
notification.  
 Hazard – represents general hazards associated with the particular location, e.g. risk 
for explosion 
 Prohibited – shows that different types of activities are not allowed, e.g. it is not 
allowed to work without wearing a safety helmet 
 Connectors – if two tasks are performed as currently suggested in the plan, it will 
imply a safety risk. If, for instance, a task is planned to be performed, there might be a 
risk that objects will fall and hit staff working at the lower deck 
 Comment – this lets each user of the IO-MAP provide information about risks, which 
they believe is present in the particular situation, e.g. based on information from 
colleagues, first-hand impression of the state of a component, information obtained 
from the criticality logs, etc. 
Members of the IO team can add jobs to the IO-MAP at different stages of the planning 
process, ranging from notifications to permissions to work. The IO-MAP application will then 
automatically highlight several types of risks associated with the jobs and (if any) risks 
associated with the combinations of jobs, by comparing the implications of the potential 
plans with the safety standards of the organization in charge. 
Design theory 
The IO-MAP design has used the following design rationale: 
 Presenting the data with a high degree of visibility, with a natural consistent mapping 
between information importance and visual salience 
 Presenting the data as “in the world”, not only as information “in the head” for less 
cognitive strain 
 Using high “data-ink” ratio, present as much valuable information as possible without 
clutter 
 Direct intuitive manipulation of data 
A high degree of data-ink ratio has been used, meaning careful use of colors and contrast to 
support the impression of visual layers. “Data” is in this case described as the meaningful 
values in the display, visual attributes such as borders, shades and lines, and used with 
caution since it can be useless “ink” in the display. 
When information is hidden in tabs or you have to click or navigate to visualize data, it can be 
cognitively demanding and is known as information “in the head”. IO-MAP frees mental 
resources by presenting information as “in the world” 
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By using direct intuitive manipulation of data, the user can immediately see the effect of the 
changes, and a novice can quickly learn basic functionality since the whole information space 
is visualized in the user interface. The graphs and results of action are continuously updated 
in IO-MAP as the user changes the input data as feedback is important. 
Functions used in IO-MAP 
A physical map of the offshore installation to help the planners and their teams get an 
overview of the area. It strengthens the natural mapping of the data through the physical 
position of risk factors, as well as contributing to building a correct mental model of the 
installation and risks. This is important as the planners are located onshore with a variable 
degree of knowledge about the installation, and not being able to go onsite inspections 
whenever they want. 
There is also the function of toggling the background between zone and noise classification. 
Zone classification shows where there is explosion danger which is marked with yellow as 
you can see from Figure 2 below. The noise classification displays the noise level by a color 
scale. 
Figure 2 The physical map of the installation 
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A calendar is used to easily see which jobs are planned on selected days by clicking on it. This 
is placed on the upper left corner in accordance to the western way of reading things from 
left to right. 
Figure 3 The calendar used in IO-MAP 
 
 
A weather data graph showing temperature, wind speed and wave height is aligned with the 
calendar. For increased readability, regardless what day that is selected, the weather data for 
that day will be shown. 
Figure 4 Different weather data used in IO-MAP 
 
 
A graph showing workload is placed under the calendar and weather data. This graph can 
show all the work permits for each day, or divide it into the electronic, mechanic, automation 
or process discipline. If a planner needs to add a job in the plan, he/she can view the graph 
to see how strained an area is and make a decision based on it. 
Figure 5 The workload bar showing number of work permits per day 
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An acceptance and rejection of work permits column placed to the left of the work permit 
status bar. This allows the planner to quickly identify those work permits that needs further 
investigation in order to get approved. This functionality is required in the work permit 
meeting where onshore and offshore staff goes through each work permit before accept or 
reject planned jobs. 
 
Findings from the study 
The safety-related information that will be tested up against the requirements is: 
Measurements: 
 Work permit system 
◦ Hot work, class A or B 
◦ Entry work 
◦ Work over sea 
◦ Work on hydrocarbon carrying system 
 Elements 
◦ Hazard 
◦ Prohibited 
◦ Comment 
Design theory: 
 Presenting data as “in the world” 
 High data-ink ratio 
 Direct intuitive manipulation of data 
Functions: 
 Physical map 
 Graphs 
◦ Calendar 
◦ Weather data 
◦ Workload graph 
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Chapter 5 
 
Testing the safety-related information from 
IO-MAP 
 
In this chapter the IO-MAPs information found in chapter 4 will be run through the set of 
requirements found in chapter 3. Every measurement, design theory and functions will be 
compared to every requirement in the set in order to break down the information and 
analyze its quality. 
A qualitative score of five levels will be presented to demonstrate the level of 
operability/usability and to give a simple depiction of how good the information from IO-
MAP is. The range of the score is: 
Very inadequate – inadequate – adequate – good – very good. 
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Hot work, class A and B 
Work with equipment and tools that constitute an effective ignition source and which, 
during normal usage, could ignite an explosive atmosphere and/or solid substances or 
liquids. 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate This indicators measures hot work, class A and B, 
although it does not separate between the classes on 
the physical map. The locations of the tasks on the 
map are also in a fixed position which may not reflect 
the real location of tasks. This can be a risk factor 
together with e.g. work on hydrocarbon carrying 
systems. 
Inadequate 
Reliable This indicates that other tasks can’t be coordinated 
with hot work, and should pretty much lead to the 
same results. 
Good 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
It is very easy to comprehend the context between 
the indication of hot work and the fact that heat 
sources will occur. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
The information given is specific and to the point, 
without unnecessary decorations. 
Very good 
Sensitive to 
change 
Changes in work permits will update the risks 
connected to it, visualizing the change in the status of 
the factor. 
Very good 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It is not possible to change/manipulate the set risk 
influencing factors linked with hot work once it is 
indicated. It is thus robust against manipulation. 
Very good 
 
Welding, soldering, cutting and brazing are common processes known as hot work and a 
source for ignition which presents a great risk on oil and gas installations. The indicator for 
hot work in IO-MAP is thus an important one. 
When e.g. hot work and work over sea is the factor of a specific task, only hot work will be 
indicated on the map with a red mark on the physical map. Also the indicator does not 
change whether it is in an explosion zone or a “safe” zone. Changing the indicator mark to 
something that warns a user that the hot work is planned in an explosion zone may be 
beneficial for the safety. 
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Elements (hazard, prohibited & connector) 
This analysis takes the elements (hazard, prohibited and connector) as they have some of the 
same features. The first one represents general hazards associated with the particular 
location, e.g. risk for explosion. Prohibited shows different types of activities that are not 
allowed, e.g. it is not allowed to work without wearing a safety helmet. The connector 
indicates if two tasks are performed as currently suggested in the plan, it will imply a safety 
risk. If, for instance, a task is planned to be performed, there might be a risk that objects will 
fall and hit staff working at the lower deck 
These elements are based on information about the characteristics of the installation and 
the standards of the organization in charge of the operation. 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate Not all hazards are be discovered by IO-MAP.  It is 
important to remind the users of this, as they could 
use IO-MAP as a cushion. 
Adequate 
Reliable This indicator relies on what is said in the paragraph 
above and mentions all the risks that are connected to 
them. This should lead to the same results when used 
by different people. 
Very good 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
These indicators are marked by a small symbol which 
appears on the physical map, given that at least one 
element is added to the work permit. This makes the 
context between the factor and the element easy to 
comprehend. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
Information about the elements are given in the 
downright corner. 
Very good 
Sensitive to 
change 
If some changes in the status of the factor are done, 
then the elements would be automatically updated. 
Very good 
Robust against 
manipulation 
The user can’t manipulate the elements as they are 
based on data which automatically posts connected 
risks. 
Very good 
 
Not all hazards are discovered by IO-MAP, so it is important to continuing the 
communication of risks amongst the planners and their teams rather than trust IO-MAP with 
every decision.  
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Entry work 
Entry includes full or partial entering of closed rooms or confined areas that do not normally 
have natural or mechanical ventilation, e.g. tanks, pipes, chain wells and exhaust pipes. 
 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate This is a valid measurement of how many jobs that 
requires entry guard, but if a job also requires hot 
work then the hot work will be visualized on the 
physical map with a red mark. 
Adequate 
Reliable The status bar indicates if there is entry work in the 
work permit. Different planners should be able to 
notice this, and plan accordingly. 
Good 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
It is easy to understand that certain guidelines needs 
attention when entry work is indicated and included 
in the work permit. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
It could be useful to include information about the 
use of personal protective equipment (PPE) when 
entry work is plotted on the IO-MAP, i.e. not enough 
details. 
Good 
Sensitive to 
change 
Changes in work permits will update the risks 
connected to it, visualizing the change in the status of 
the factor. 
Adequate 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It is not possible to change/manipulate the set risk 
influencing factors linked with entry work once it is 
indicated. It is thus robust against manipulation. 
Very good 
 
The indication of entry in IO-MAP is easy to comprehend, but there is maybe a lack of 
information available in IO-MAP regarding work of this kind. More specifically what type of 
personal protective equipment is needed based on the level of ventilation in the room or 
area. Although this type of information is probably available in the Safe Job Analysis (SJA), it 
could be useful to inform what type of ventilation is readily available at certain locations. 
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Graphs (calendar, weather, workload) 
The graphs contain a calendar to select the day wanted, a weather graph showing 
temperature, wind speed and wave height, and a workload graph showing the density of 
tasks per day. 
 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate The wind and wave graph gives a static forecast which 
may affect the decisions on whether a job can be 
safely done or not. Predictions about the weather are 
never exact, but it is “as good as it gets”. The calendar 
and workload are accurate. 
Adequate 
Reliable People may interpret information differently in the 
cases of weather/workload, which may lead to 
different results, e.g. users of IO-MAP undervaluing 
wind speed can cause adverse situations. 
Inadequate 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
The graphs are uniform and easy to get information 
out of. The calendar is similar to those used on other 
applications e.g. on the internet. Weather and 
workload are using an x-y axis, where x is time and y is 
pressure load, which is pretty standard. 
Adequate 
Efficient and 
simple information 
The graphs are aligned vertically so that all 
information from the day that is chosen is readily 
available. 
Very good 
Sensitive to 
change 
Workload adjusts itself as work permits are added or 
changed, while weather can be updated regularly, 
thus changing the data automatically. 
Very good 
Robust against 
manipulation 
Any upper limits for weather and workload can be 
interpreted differently, unless governmental or 
company regulations gives specific requirements. If a 
job is urgent, planners can ignore indications of strain 
from weather and workload. 
Ok 
 
Most people are used to reading graphs which makes the calendar, weather and workload 
graph easy to comprehend, and the information given is intuitive, and the alignment in the 
graphs makes the information easy to read. The workload graph is updated whenever there 
are changes in the work permits and the weather graph can be updated regularly which 
indicates change over a reasonably period of time.  
However, the users of IO-MAP have to interpret the data themselves. Onshore planners may 
not be aware of how much weather can affect jobs, or how much workload that may strain 
the workers offshore. There is also no visualization of values of weather or workload that 
may be affiliated with too much risk for either some tasks or all tasks. 
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High data-ink ratio 
A high degree of data-ink ratio has been used, meaning careful use of colors and contrast to 
support the impression of visual layers.  
 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate N/A N/A 
Reliable It leads to less room for misinterpretations and more 
uniform results/decisions when “as much valuable 
information as possible” is presented which is the 
situation. 
Good 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
Although there are no visual borders or lines used in 
the software, it is easy to identify the areas of the 
various functions. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
Some info is hidden, e.g. camera/pictures of the 
location, and information about work permits. This 
reduces cognitive load. In addition there are no 
border, shades or lines to make it look clean, and 
preventing unnecessary “ink”. 
Very good 
Sensitive to 
change 
N/A N/A 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It is not possible to use this feature for manipulating 
results. 
Very good 
 
This function makes IO-MAP simpler and easier to navigate in the menu. The requirements 
“Valid and accurate” and “sensitive to change” does not apply to this function as it is not 
directly an indicator, but it could be helpful to include it nonetheless. All in all this 
visualization technique is successful in supporting the impression of visual layers. 
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Work on hydrocarbon carrying system 
This includes work on pipe systems, tanks and associated components that can pose a 
danger of releasing oil/gas/condensate. 
 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate All equipment and machinery has a tag in IO-MAP 
which makes it easy to check out if the hydrocarbon 
carrying system is used or not. 
Adequate 
Reliable It is a reliable measurement of the risk of hydrocarbon 
release. 
Very good 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
It is easy to comprehend that work on such a system 
poses a risk of releasing flammable substances, which 
should lead to certain guidelines and precautions. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
This indicator holds the essential information needed. Very good 
Sensitive to 
change 
Changes in work permits will update the risks 
connected to it, visualizing the change in the status of 
the factor. 
Very good 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It is not possible to change/manipulate the set risk 
influencing factors linked with work on hydrocarbon 
carrying system once it is indicated. It is thus robust 
against manipulation. 
Very good 
 
This is an approved indicator as it fulfills the requirements. It is concise and explains what 
you need to plan safely. Although, as with entry work, the indicator does not show on the 
physical map if hot work is planned at the same place as the hot work indicator takes its 
place with a red mark. But it may be unlikely that hot work and work on hydrocarbon 
carrying system are planned on the same day for the same place. 
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Work over sea 
This is work that takes place outside of permanent railings. Exceptions are work in hydraulic 
baskets and work on approved scaffolding when an extra safety measure (barrier) is used, 
such as anti-fall securing system, manrider or net. 
 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate This is a valid measurement of the risk of falling from 
heights/sea.  
Very good 
Reliable Should lead to the same results when used by 
different people. Though as the IO-MAP report says 
“high-waves combined with work over sea implies 
that a standby boat should be present.” This implies 
that a definition of high-waves should be clarified. 
Adequate 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
Easy to put the context between the factors playing in 
and the indicator together. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
It holds the essential information needed which 
reduces cognitive load. 
Very good 
Sensitive to 
change 
The safety when working over sea is influenced by 
amongst other one factor, the weather, which is 
updated regularly. 
Very good 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It is not possible to change/manipulate the set risk 
influencing factors linked with work over sea once it is 
indicated. It is thus robust against manipulation. 
Very good 
 
As with the indicator for work on hydrocarbon carrying system, work over sea is also an 
approved indicator. It seems as though care must be taken to check the weather forecast 
when planning work over sea as it may affect the safety of the workers. A stronger link 
between the two indicators could be beneficial. 
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Direct intuitive manipulation of data 
By using direct intuitive manipulation of data, the user can immediately see the effect of the 
changes, and a novice can quickly learn basic functionality since the whole information space 
is visualized in the user interface. The graphs and results of action are continuously updated 
in IO-MAP as the user changes the input data as feedback is important. 
 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate N/A N/A 
Reliable N/A N/A 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
This function makes IO-MAP more intuitive as the 
whole information space is visualized in the user 
interface. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
Information is updated automatically when changes in 
IO-MAP is made which makes this feature successful 
Very good 
Sensitive to 
change 
The goal of this design is to upgrade graphs and 
results of actions made, so it is naturally sensitive to 
change. 
Very good 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It is not possible to use this feature for manipulating 
results. 
Very good 
 
This design theory manages to give vital feedback to the users based on the continuously 
update of graphs and results of actions. As it cannot be described as an indicator, I feel that 
the requirements “valid and accurate” and “reliable” are not applicable to this test. 
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Physical map 
Provides an overview of the area, and strengthens the natural mapping of the data through 
the physical position of risk factors, as well as contributing to building a correct mental 
model of the installation and risks. The physical map also displays functions such as zone and 
noise classification, crane and camera area and the possibility to choose a discipline. 
 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate There are several measures within this map. The zone 
classification which shows the risk of explosion in 
certain areas indicates either explosion zone or no 
explosion, which I feel is a bit “black and white”. 
Adequate 
Reliable The objective of the map is to build a mental model of 
the installations and risks. This should lead to the 
same interpretations when used by different 
planners.  
Very good 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
The map makes this software what it is, and ties many 
indicators together to make IO-MAP itself 
comprehensible. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
The map is simple and without unnecessary 
equipment or other graphic decorations. It leaves a 
clean and simple appearance. 
Good 
Sensitive to 
change 
IO-MAP automatically posts work tasks on the map 
once they are added, and changes the 
indicators/marks on the map if the work permits 
themselves are changed. 
Very good 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It is not possible to use this feature for manipulating 
results. 
Very good 
 
The map is an important part of IO-MAP which should be able to tie the software together. It 
does manage to provide a mental picture of the installation with further help from the live 
cameras and the possibility to view different decks of the installation. 
The zone classification tells you where risk of explosion is present, but it could have been 
made like the noise classification which displays the noise level by a color scale. The risk of 
explosion can vary from place to place instead of either being present or not. 
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Presenting data as “in the world” 
When information is hidden in tabs or you have to click or navigate to visualize data, it can be 
cognitively demanding and is known as information “in the head”. IO-MAP frees mental 
resources by presenting information as “in the world” 
 
 Comment Rate 
Valid and accurate It was found that work permits could have been 
linked to more information. 
Good 
Reliable This function enhances reliability as less cognitive 
efforts leads to more similar choices. 
Very good 
Easily 
comprehensible, 
intuitive 
The less information that is hidden, the more IO-MAP 
is easier to comprehend. 
Very good 
Efficient and 
simple information 
This function makes the information easier to gather 
and is thus successful. 
Very good 
Sensitive to 
change 
All changes are shown directly when information is 
presented “in the world” which makes it sensitive to 
change. 
Very good 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It is not possible to use this feature for manipulating 
results. 
Very good 
 
This function is very practical in making it easier for the user to gather and assess the 
situation. It reduces the amount of clicking and tabs which leads to less cognitive strain and 
frustration. It is all in all a successful feature of IO-MAP. 
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IO-MAP 
In chapter 3 several operators were described by Vatn that can be applied to a risk picture 
which is a set of undesired events, the causes and factors that may contribute to an 
undesired event, the possible consequences of the event with corresponding influencing 
factors, and uncertainties related to all these issues. A risk picture is said to be a rich risk 
picture if it is possible to apply operators on the risk picture. An operator is a tool that 
operates on the risk picture to present it in a certain manner. These operators can be 
applied to IO-MAP itself to test it for its overall performance. 
 Comment 
Filtering Filtering requires a risk picture that contains information such that it is 
possible to search for e.g., hazardous events of a specific type. This can 
be attributed to the work permit system which includes hot work, entry 
work, work over sea and work on hydrocarbon carrying system, but in 
reality there are several other hazardous events on an installation which 
is not included by IO-MAP, e.g. isolation of safety system, pressure 
testing, work with dangerous and radioactive substances which all 
require work permits (Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended Guidelines, 
2003). 
Aggregation There is maybe a lack of an aggregated risk picture to get a picture of 
what kind of tasks are on the agenda per day. This can be helpful in 
understanding the comprehensive risk picture for the whole installation. 
By taking the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) of the installation and 
other risk analysis, we can graph this risk picture. 
Merging This can also be attributed to the work permit system. Take work over 
sea as an example which represents several outcomes, but can be similar 
in nature i.e. man over board or some other close relation with water. 
Zooming There is the possibility of selecting one deck at a time, and also the 
possibility of limit the time to days, but not hours. Zooming is thus 
possible for both space and time. 
Hiding/unhiding This operator is somewhat similar to the requirement “efficient and 
simple information”, as the goal is to present data so that conclusions 
can be easily made without lavish data. I think IO-MAP in general 
succeeds in doing so. 
 
IO-MAP holds up pretty well against these operators, but it could be beneficial to add a risk 
picture for the installation as a whole to depict the situation in a given time. It would also 
help to include more hazardous events such as isolation of safety system, pressure testing 
and work with dangerous and radioactive substances to be able to filter in IO-MAP 
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Chapter 6 
Results 
 
This chapter contains the results from reflections made after testing the software first hand, 
and testing the safety-related information from IO-MAP against the set of requirements 
from the literature review.  
 
IO-MAP 
The Integrated Operations Maintenance and Modification Planner (IO-MAP) overall purpose 
is to investigate how software technology can support a distributed team of planners in 
developing plans for maintenance and modification activities in which safety issues are 
adequately prioritized.  
A day of testing the IO-MAP was necessary to get the feel of the software. In my experience 
it had useful functions and indicators that would benefit the planners in gaining fragmented 
overview over the platform. A tidy work surface was the first impression where functions 
were split into different sections. This made it also possible to avoid pop-up or new web 
browser windows, which can be confusing and ads strain to the users.  
It can be difficult when programming such software to determine the interface of how much 
information about the tasks should be available for the user to see. In my experience it 
lacked sufficient information to get the full picture of the tasks and their practices. 
 
Results from testing the safety-related information 
Entry work 
When entry work is planned it can be useful to include what type of personal protective 
equipment (PPE) is to be used for the particular task. This can be included in e.g. the 
comment section. 
Also if both hot work and entry work is needed for the job, then hot work is indicated (red 
mark) on the physical map of the installation and the entry work (green mark) is hidden. 
Although, if a task nearby has safety conflictions with entry work this would possibly be 
indicated with a connector. Maybe a number on the mark itself indicating how many safety 
issues are connected with the task will alert the planners of this issue. 
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Graphs (calendar, weather and workload) 
Onshore planners may not be aware of how much weather can affect jobs, or how much 
workload may strain the workers offshore. To give an indication of this it may be suitable to 
propose measures for extreme wind or temperatures, too much workload etc. This can be 
indicated by a range of colors where e.g. red is indication of inadequate safety, yellow 
indicates caution and green indicates ordinary practices. 
Hazard 
Once a hazard is added in IO-MAP, maybe some sort of action should be required to provide 
adequate safety before the planners can go ahead with other tasks.  
Hot work 
The indicator for hot work does not change in any way regardless of it being in an explosion 
zone or “safe” zone, or if the hot work is of class A or B. It could be beneficial to show this 
e.g. in the workload bar. This would give valuable information to the risk picture as a whole.  
IO-MAP 
There are several tasks that require work permits and among those are hot work, entry 
work, work over sea and work on hydrocarbon carrying system which is included in IO-MAP, 
but there are more tasks than that. According to Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended 
Guidelines (2003) work such as isolation of safety system, pressure testing, work with 
dangerous and radioactive substances etc. requires work permit. It may be beneficial to add 
the remaining tasks to IO-MAP as they affect safety as well. 
Tasks that have been successfully done (i.e. absence of injuries, damages and near misses) 
are not “stored” so that any new experiences gained will not show when the same/similar 
tasks are due to be done later in time. Valuable information discovered when planning these 
tasks could get lost in the system.  
By marking the different tasks according to how much risk that is associated to it is easy to 
get a quick overview over the total risk picture. Below is an example of how it can be done. 
Marking the different tasks with a green-yellow-red indicator system, where green tasks are 
linked with more or less no risk of hazard, yellow tasks are linked with tolerable risk of 
hazard and red tasks are linked with high risk of hazards. 
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Figure 6. An example of how the total risk picture can be visualized on a certain day using work permits 
 
 
This gives each day a comprehensive risk picture which can be useful to see how much 
“pressure” there is on safety. This risk picture can be presented to management or other 
personnel who has no knowledge of the software to make it easy for them to see “the big 
picture”. This kind of risk picture can be established based on barriers and safety functions 
available on the installation, risk influencing factors (RIFs) and operational aspects. 
Combining these factors will give a prognosis of the risk picture over time. Vatn’s operators 
(p. 17) can be of help to make this a reality. 
 
Figure 7 Example of presenting the risk at a given time for the installation 
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Discussion 
 
This chapter will present a discussion about safety indicators, risk visualization, the literature 
review, the set of requirements and the methodology for testing the safety-related 
information in IO-MAP. The section is rounded off by discussing the visualization of safety 
indicators. 
 
Findings from the literature review shows that safety indicators have an extensive field of 
research and literature and still remain a hot topic of discussion within safety professionals 
in the industry. The borders between safety indicators and other indicators are somewhat 
diffuse as the discussion in the literature and the safety science debate shows. 
The literature on risk visualization is not rich in data and research in this field is rather 
limited. Risk visualization is the systematic effort of using (interactive) images to augment 
the quality of risk communication along the entire risk management cycle. We may use 
literature on just visualization which is broader and more extensive, but we than have to 
make sure it can be used to communicate risk in a proper way. Risk visualization is an 
exciting topic that has a lot of opportunities for improvement. 
It was discovered from the review that many professionals from safety had a lot of the same 
view on several requirements within safety indicators, with the exception of a few. These 
requirements were thus natural to include in the set of requirements to test IO-MAP. 
Validity is a recurring criteria which is important for a solid foundation in developing 
indicators. A valid indicator reassures safety management that their decisions based upon 
these indications are correct. The level of sensitivity in an indicator determines how easy it is 
to detect changes in a system over time, giving better leeway in determining whether or not 
safety is good enough. Reliability is needed to give a clear picture of the situation regardless 
of who the user of the indicator is. The indicator needs to be robust against manipulation 
which will help securing the validity and reliability of it. 
Information from the literature shows that visualizing relevant information is a key aspect, 
which is done by filtering out unnecessary information. This reduces cognitive load and 
makes it easier to understand and assess information. Comprehensibility is mentioned by 
Kjellèn and Haugen et.al respectively about visualization and indicators which shows the 
significance of the attribute. It should show changes in the status of the factor in a way that if 
negative effects on safety were to happen, users would be bound to notice it. 
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After putting IO-MAP to the test, it was discovered that not all requirements were suited to 
test the safety-related information found in chapter 4. This could be due to the fact that not 
all information from chapter 4 can be directly transferred as visualizing safety indicators 
rather than being explicitly an indicator or a visualization technique. However, the decision to 
include this information nonetheless is that it can be useful to test them based on the 
remaining requirements that can be used to extract information.  
Visualizing safety indicators is not the same as the two aspects visualizing and safety 
indicators. But if we combine the definitions of the two we can say that visualizing safety 
indicators is the means for using images to augment the quality of measures in the changes 
in the level of safety as a result of actions taken by the safety management. This combines 
and satisfies both definitions. 
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Conclusion/main findings 
 
The aim of this thesis is to make suggestions for further developments of IO-MAP and to 
develop a set of criteria for visualizing safety indicators. Safety indicators was defined as an 
observable characteristic that presumably holds a positive correlation with safety, and has 
been selected, among other means, for the purpose of supervision of safety. The safety 
indicator can be related to defense lines according to defense-in-depth such as physical 
barriers and safety functions. Risk visualization was defined as the systematic effort of using 
(interactive) images to augment the quality of risk communication along the entire risk 
management cycle. 
This thesis has researched the literature to find what requirements are best suited for 
visualizing safety indicators. Through the research it was discovered some recurrent 
requirements which was natural to include which served the purpose and amounted to a set 
of requirements. The safety-related information from IO-MAP was then extracted so that the 
set could test this information from Integrated Operations Maintenance and Modification 
Planner (IO-MAP). This information consisted of measurements (the work permit system and 
elements), design theory (presenting data as “in the world”, high data-ink ratio and direct 
intuitive manipulation of data) and functions (the physical map and functionality graphs). 
Table 1 The set of requirements 
Valid and accurate We measure what we want to measure with a complete and accurate visual 
representation of the data 
Reliable Lead to the same results when used by different people in the same situation 
Easily comprehensible, 
intuitive 
Should be intuitive, and the context between the factor and the indicator must 
be easy to comprehend 
Efficient and simple 
information 
Avoid decorative visualization to prevent overwhelmingly detailed data and 
reduce cognitive load 
Sensitive to change Able to reflect and visualize changes in the status of the factor 
Robust against 
manipulation 
It should not be possible to override indications of hazardous situations. 
 
After testing the safety-related information from IO-MAP some points were discovered that 
could be improved. Main points from the results were: 
• Include a total risk picture to visualize the sum of risks connected to the planned 
tasks per day 
• Adding more types of work that requires work permit (e.g. isolation of safety system, 
pressure testing, and work with dangerous and radioactive substances) 
• Implementing more information about the tasks to get the full picture of the tasks 
and how they are done in practice 
 52 
 
It was found that not all requirements were suited to test the safety-related information 
from IO-MAP. This could be due to the fact that not all information from IO-MAP could be 
directly transferred as visualizing safety indicators rather than being explicitly an indicator or 
a visualization technique.  
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